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1Abstract: There is emerging evidence that globalization is beginning to provide new
opportunities for global coalitions of advocacy groups to bring market-based pressures to
bear upon major transnational firms in a way that promotes higher standards of social and
environmental responsibility in production processes and trade relations. This can be seen
as successful citizen-led attention to the “production and process methods” which the
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations explicitly chose to omit. More broadly it may
reflect the increased importance of global branding, improved awareness in both
consumer and financial markets of the social and environmental practices of firms, and
collaboration on the part of producers to reduce their risk of brand-damaging attacks on
the social and environmental responsibility of their practices. The emergence and growth
of the Forest Stewardship Council as the “gold standard” for sustainable forest
management, and the expensive attempts by the forest products industry to create
industry-driven substitute standards, may be the pivotal example of this phenomenon.
The further growth of certified Fair Trade practices under Transfair USA is another
example. Both cases provide important lessons as to the elements of present and future
success for this movement. They may also represent creative new solutions for problems
of persistent poverty by using the leverage of markets in the global North to improve the
ability of workers, farmers, and other producers in the global South to build natural assets
in ways that generate socially and environmentally sustainable livelihoods.
Introduction
Few consumers realize that the World Trade Organization (WTO) prohibits placing any
restrictions on the importation of products solely because of the way in which they were
produced. Forest products cannot be banned no matter how egregious the denuding of
whole mountainsides, no matter how much erosion or contamination of rivers may have
resulted, no matter what the labor conditions under which logging, milling, and finishing
took place. Similarly, textiles and apparel cannot be banned because of the working
conditions faced in factories abroad. Food products cannot be prohibited on the basis of
the chemicals used in their production, not even when those chemicals are banned in the
importing country, unless traces of the banned chemicals are actually found on the
surfaces or in the preparations of the imported products themselves. The ways that
products are produced, “production and process methods” or “PPMs” in the language of
trade negotiators, were deliberately excluded from the Uruguay Round of trade
negotiations that concluded with the agreement to create the WTO in 1993. At the time,
negotiators believed that countries might use their disapproval for the ways that products
are made in other countries as a “barrier to free trade.”
The impact of this exclusion has been significant. No matter how high a local community
or a nation chooses to set its own standards for social and environmental regulations,
including minimum wage laws, environmental protection laws, or worker safety laws,
that same government cannot impede the importation of items produced under much
worse (and presumably less costly) conditions elsewhere in the world. This decision by
the trade negotiators has unleashed a massive force for lowering social and environmental
standards worldwide, undercutting generations of legislative progress and hard-earned
community and worker rights.
2Concern with production and process methods, however, has increased rapidly since the
creation of the WTO. This paper outlines a broad and fast-growing movement to use
voluntary, stakeholder-based, negotiated social and environmental standards to substitute
for the (in)ability of nations to exert control over the nature of products they import,
including the production and process methods under which they were produced. This
international movement towards voluntary standards has previously been described in
terms of the pursuit of higher corporate accountability and the use of certification
processes based on firms’ altruistic behavior.1  This paper focuses on a much more
dynamic advocacy-led process that is changing corporate practices more rapidly than
altruism alone has done in the past. The paper outlines the strategies used by social and
environmental advocacy organizations to bring about corporate compliance, the reasons
why corporations are positively seeking to anticipate and participate in standard-setting
and certification processes, and the lessons for market-based citizen-led advocacy that
can be drawn from these experiences, lessons which can be potentially applied to much
broader areas of civil society. The conclusion, succinctly, is that advocacy-led
certification processes “have arisen to govern firm behavior in a global space that has
eluded the control of states and international organizations.”2 More explicitly, they
represent an increasingly successful pursuit of alternatives to the downward pressure
placed upon social and environmental responsibility by the refusal of the WTO to permit
the use of PPMs as a basis for trade policy.
The paper draws most heavily on the experiences of two successful advocacy-led
standard-setting processes. The first is the Forest Stewardship Council, a small
international nongovernmental organization that has set the highest standards for social
and environmental responsibility in sustainable forest management and stunned the forest
products industry by the speed of its growth. The second is the “Fair Trade” certification
movement, which was originally established in Europe and has grown most rapidly since
adopting advocacy-based processes in the United States in 1998.
Seemingly Improbable Recent Events
Who would have guessed that Greenpeace, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and
other environmental groups would share the podium in June 1998 with the top executives
of MacMillan Bloedel, the giant Vancouver-based timber and paper company, and would
encourage consumers to give preference to "MacBlo" products? The environmental
groups had long pilloried MacMillan Bloedel for its clear-cutting forest practices in
Clayoquot Sound on Vancouver Island and elsewhere on the British Columbia coast. On
that day, however, MacMillan Bloedel announced that it would cease clear-cutting
practices in its British Columbia logging operations and that it would seek broader
certification of its forest management under the principles of the Forest Stewardship
Council. Commenting on this announcement, Lester Brown noted:
Under the leadership of a new chief executive, Tom Stevens, the company
affirmed that clear-cutting will be replaced by selective cutting, leaving trees to
check runoff and soil erosion, to provide wildlife habitat, and to help regenerate
the forest. In doing so, it acknowledged the growing reach of the environmental
3movement. MacMillan Bloedel was not only being pressured by local groups, but
it also had been the primary target of a Greenpeace campaign to ban clear-cutting
everywhere…
Among giant corporations that could once be counted on to mount a monolithic
opposition to serious environmental reform, a growing number of high profile
CEOs have begun to sound more like spokespersons for Greenpeace than for the
bastions of global capitalism of which they are a part… What in the world is
going on?3
The Greenpeace campaign had focused on a relatively novel “markets campaign”
strategy: to lobby and demonstrate against the purchasers of MacMillan Bloedel forest
products, pressuring them to cancel or threaten to cancel orders unless the firm
implemented improved environmental practices.4
A second seemingly improbable event occurred on October 8, 1999, when the Rainforest
Action Network (RAN) published a full-page paid advertisement in The New York Times
urging consumers to shop at Home Depot, Inc. The ad was unlikely for many reasons.
RAN had actively campaigned against Home Depot for more than two years,
orchestrating more than 700 demonstrations against the company’s purchasing policies.
RAN had organized activists dressed in bear costumes and using megaphones in the
rafters of Home Depot stores; it had draped the Home Depot headquarters building with
5-story banners, and it had filled billboards across the street from shareholder meetings
with images of forest clear-cutting allegedly linked to Home Depot’s wood purchases.5
RAN was also alleged to have been behind other, less traditional means of placing
pressure on the firm, including a somewhat scurrilous website. The paid advertisement in
the Times resulted from a decision by Home Depot, announced on August 26, 1999, to
end all purchases of wood products coming from “old growth” forests and to give
preference in its purchases to products certified as arising from sustainable forest
practices, such as under the standards of the Forest Stewardship Council.6
A third event of this sort occurred on April 13th, 2000, when Global Exchange, a social
activist organization in Oakland, California, turned threatened demonstrations against the
Starbucks coffee chain in 30 U.S. cities into demonstrations in praise of its coffee
purchasing practices. Starbucks is the largest chain of coffee houses in the U.S.,
accounting for more than 20 percent of the total. Global Exchange had spent more than a
year orchestrating a campaign against Starbucks, because the firm refused to introduce
the sale of certified coffee that would provide higher prices and better conditions for
small-scale coffee producers worldwide. This effort was part of a much longer, multi-
year strategy to improve the benefits from trade for producers in the global South through
various mechanisms, including a certified “fair trade” system. Four days before the
planned demonstrations, Starbucks executives signed a letter of intent with TransFair
USA, a fair-trade certification organization, to offer certified coffee in all 2700 Starbucks
outlets in the U.S. On October 4th, 2000, certified fair trade coffee began to be sold at
Starbucks.7
4Basic Concepts
What are the certification systems that have triggered these improbable events?
Definitions in the literature vary. According to the International Standards Organization:
Certification is a procedure by which a third party gives written assurance that a
product, process or service conforms to specified requirements… It is distinct
from the other systems of proof of conformity such as supplier declarations,
laboratory test reports or inspection body reports. Certification is based on the
results of tests, inspections and audits and gives confidence to the customer on
account of the systematic intervention of a competent third body. 8
According to the World Bank:
Product certification involves written documentation that a product meets detailed
technical specifications. Governments and consumers are increasingly demanding
such certifications of goods in international commerce. Certification involves
testing a product against either a voluntary, de facto, or regulatory standard and is
often carried out organizations that are independent of any link to the
manufacturer or purchaser. After testing, a certificate is issued that attests to the
fact that a product meets a set standard.9
As applied to forest management, Upton and Bass have defined certification as “an
economic market-based instrument which aims to raise awareness and provide incentives
for both producers and consumers towards a more responsible use of forests.” 10
Certification is a market-driven process designed to encourage and reward firms that
choose to produce or trade in products that use the highest social and environmental
standards in their production. Rather than requiring those standards by law (which is
often politically difficult to achieve), and rather than trying to block the importation of
products that do not meet the standards (which is not allowed under WTO rules),
certification offers a positive alternative system designed to encourage compliance with
voluntary standards and to reward those who do comply by offering increased market
share and, at times, market price premiums.
In theory, certification requires little more than an independent assessment of
management practices. In reality, the creation of a credible certification system requires
the development of standards by a diverse set of stakeholders in an inclusive process
designed to build consensus. Without an agreed-upon set of standards, the meanings of
certification would vary widely. There is a need, therefore, to establish a set of certifiers
who are independent of the outcome of the certification process, as well as an
accreditation system for the certifiers that assures the integrity of their application of the
standards.
5Figure 1
The Forest Stewardship Council
The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), a nonprofit organization created by an
international assembly of about 300 people in Toronto in 1993, has created a certification
system whose aim is to transform the $50 billion worldwide timber industry. The FSC
opened its offices in 1994 in Oaxaca, Mexico, partly because it wanted to be based in the
global South, and partly because of the personal preferences of its first Executive
Director. From that original base, the FSC has grown to have operations in 50 countries;
and its international headquarters will be moved to Europe in 2002.
The governance of the FSC is structured around three “chambers”: an environmental
chamber, an economic chamber, and a social chamber. Each chamber represents a group
that has a vested interest in -- or are stakeholders in -- the management of forests around
the world. In addition, the FSC structures all of its international activities to include
balanced representation from the global North and the global South. When people run for
election to the FSC board of directors, for example, they run for a position in the “social
chamber from the global North,” or for the “economic chamber from the global South.”
How does it work? The Forest Stewardship Council has developed a stakeholder-based
set of forest management standards, with ample participation of all three chambers,
including timber and paper industry representatives, social and environmental
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and local community representatives. The FSC
does not undertake the certification itself; rather it accredits other organizations or firms
to perform the certification. It assesses candidates to make certain that they have the
capability and knowledge of the field to analyze the forest management practices of
applicant timber companies. It monitors the certifiers, resolves any disputes that may
arise in the application of the standards, and protects the integrity of the label that it
creates. The certifiers themselves determine the eligibility of firms and other forest
owners to receive certification, issue the FSC certificates, and then monitor compliance
annually to assure continued eligibility.
There are two types of certificates issued by the
FSC. The first is a “forest management certificate”
based upon how the forest is managed; the second
is a “chain-of-custody” certificate that tracks the
wood from the forest to the consumer. To obtain
chain-of-custody certification, a mill that is going
to process certified wood is required to establish a
system for keeping the certified wood separate
from the non-certified wood. Only forest products
derived from wood from certified forests, and
processed in a certified chain-of-custody mill or
factory, qualify to carry the FSC logo (Figure 1).
Figure 1.  The FSC Seal
6The broad principles embodied in FSC standards for sustainable forest management
embrace social as well as environmental characteristics, as exhibited in Figure 2. Detailed
dimensions of each of these standards have been developed for worldwide application,
and localized standards are being created for most of the countries (and for sub-regions
within countries) where FSC is operating. The social standards are intended to secure and
protect long-term tenure and use rights and the rights of indigenous peoples. The
ecological standards specifically call for the conservation of old-growth or primary
forests and other high-priority conservation areas, a documented reduction in the use of
chemicals such as herbicides, and a prohibition on the use of invasive or exotic species
(including some genetically-modified species) in tree plantations. FSC standards also call
for the reduction of clearcutting, and require the protection of the interests of local
communities and forest-industry workers. They allow for the certification of plantations
so long as they comply with the other standards.
Figure 2.
Forest Stewardship Council Principles (abridged version)
The Forest Stewardship Council principles state that in order to be certified, a forest
operation shall:
· Meet all applicable laws.
· Have legally established, long-term forest management rights.
· Recognize and respect the rights of indigenous peoples.
· Maintain the economic and social well-being of local communities.
· Conserve the forest's economic resources.
· Protect biological diversity.
· Have a written management plan.
· Engage in regular monitoring.
· Conserve primary forests and well-developed secondary forests.
· Manage plantations so as to alleviate pressures on natural forests.
Source: Forest Stewardship Council-US, as quoted in “Ethical Wood, Equitable Coffee:  Big U.S. retailers
give certified products a major boost,” by Rose Gutfeld, Ford Foundation Report (Fall 2000).
FSC Success
Since 1995, when FSC began certifying its first forests, the number of acres of forest
certified around the world has grown to 60 million (as of mid-2001). To put this in
context, there are approximately 1.1 billion acres (450 million hectares) of working
forests worldwide. That suggests that the management of more than 5 percent of the
world's working forests is now certified under the FSC standards. Similarly, more than
1700 firms were certified for chain-of-custody as of mid- 2001. The rates of growth are
depicted in Figure 3.
7Success as measured by demand is even greater. The demand for FSC products has been
growing far faster than supply. Price premia are being paid for certified products,
although this fact rarely is acknowledged publicly. Price premia of 4% to 12% on
softwoods in European markets are admitted by one of the largest European certified
forest products firms. Premia of 100% on certified teak have been paid to Malaysian
exporters. One of Canada's largest forest products manufacturers has offered a 30 percent
premium on FSC-certified timber delivered to its mills, even though its own forest lands
are not yet certified. Documenting these market characteristics is difficult because it is in
the interest of neither buyer nor seller to publicize the information. Buyers would prefer
that sellers not expect a premium. Sellers receiving a premium have no interest in
stimulating increases in supply by others, lest they lose their premium prices.
The demand is not driven directly by consumers of forest products who seek certified
wood products in stores. It is driven, in fact, by the commitments of major producers of
forest products and by major retailers of forest products in response to their own internal
culture of social and environmental responsibility, a culture that is strongly encouraged
by the pressure brought to bear by the advocacy networks’ market campaigns. One
indicator of these corporate commitments is the surging membership in the Global Forest
Figure 3.  FSC Forest Management and Chain of Custody Certifications
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8and Trade Network (GFTN) and its U.S. member, the Certified Forest Products Council.
More than 700 companies have now joined the GFTN, thereby formally expressing a
preference for forest products certified under the FSC standards. The members include all
five of the largest Do-it-Yourself retail chains in the United States, as well as major forest
product manufacturers such as Andersen Windows. The network also includes forest
product business consumers such as Nike (for paper and cardboard), The Gap (for
flooring and shelving), and Kinko's (the largest photocopying chain in the U.S.).11
The FSC also has major opponents. They are clustered in three rival forest management
certification schemes in the global North. The first is an industry-created set of standards
fashioned by the American Forest and Paper Association, the principal industry
association of timber and paper companies in the United States. Its program, the
Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI),12 claims to encompass 94 million acres of forests in
the United States and Canada. In Europe, where most large forests are now certified
under FSC, small-scale forest owners have set up a Pan-European Forest Certification
system (PEFC) which in less than a year claims to have certified compliance with its
standards on more than 36 million hectares (79 million acres).13 Finally, a smaller rival
certification scheme for forests is the Canadian Standards Association (CSA), a general
purpose standard-setting organization with standards for more than 2000 products.14 The
most complete comparative evaluation of the four systems to date reaches unambiguous
conclusions. Using such criteria as transparency, stakeholder participation, and
assessment procedures, the study concludes that:
…[T]he Forest Stewardship Council is currently the only independent and
credible certification scheme in the [forest products] market… This does not
mean that the FSC scheme is perfect. Continued vigilance is required to ensure
that its implementation lives up to its commitments.15
The report’s toughest criticism focuses on the PEFC scheme, where it was found that
substantial tracts of land were certified as fulfilling PEFC requirements without ever
being visited, and numerous tracts were included in the PEFC statistics without the
landowner's knowledge or consent.
A further comparison of FSC and SFI has been published by the National Wildlife
Federation, the Natural Resources Council of Maine, and Environmental Advocates.16 It
too found the following systemic differences:
· FSC sets more stringent guidelines in many areas of environmental protection,
such as maintenance of older forest and reserve areas, use of chemicals, exotic
and genetically modified species, and conversion of natural forest to plantations.
These guidelines promote ecologically sound forest management.
· FSC is based on mandatory standards, and a required and consistently applied
third-party audit; SFI is not.
· Most FSC standards emphasize on-the-ground field performance, while few SFI
standards evaluate on-the-ground results.
9· FSC requires public reporting of audit results and enforceable conditions; SFI
does not.
· FSC has social criteria focusing on local communities and indigenous peoples;
SFI does not.
· FSC has Chain-of-Custody Certification and a product labeling system that allows
processors, retailers and consumers to confidently know that their wood comes
from a well-managed forest; SFI does not.
The battle will continue for the hearts and minds of consumers and retailers. The
advantage rests with the FSC, however, precisely because of the strong support that it
receives from social and environmental NGOs.
Transfair USA and Fairtrade Labeling Organizations International
A significantly different form of
social certification is offered by the
Fairtrade Labeling Organizations
International (FLO) and its U.S.
affiliate, Transfair USA. The FLO
was born of the Max Haavelar
Foundation in the Netherlands and
Transfair International in
Germany, two groups that
separately had begun to define
criteria for fair trade and to label
products that met those criteria.
They joined into a common
organization in 1998. The
standards for certified fair trade
coffee are quite simple (Figure 4).
This certification system
deliberately seeks to focus on
improving the market conditions
faced by the 50% of coffee
producers who are small-scale
family farmers, many of them
organized in cooperatives.
Approximately 80-85% of the
worlds coffee farmers fall into this
category. 17
Figure 4.  Certified Fair Trade Criteria
Under Transfair USA's guidelines, coffee can be sold as
Fair Trade Certified in the United States if importers agree
to:
· Purchase from the family-farmer cooperatives
included in the International Fair Trade Coffee
Registry.
· Guarantee cooperatives a minimum "fair-trade price"
of $1.26 a pound for their coffee ($1.41 if it is also
certified organic). If world price rises above this floor,
cooperatives will receive a small (five cents per
pound)  premium above the market price.
· Provide partial payment to farmers at the time they
ship their coffee, against future sales, to help the
cooperatives stay out of debt between harvest seasons.
· Develop direct, long-term relationships with producer
groups, thereby cutting out  middlemen and bringing
greater commercial stability to an extremely unstable
market.
  And if coffee roasters agree to:
· Buy Fair Trade certified coffee only from certified
importers.
· Use the Fair Trade certified label only on Fair Trade
certified products.
· Use the label only on blends that contain 100% Fair
Trade certified coffee.
· Submit quarterly reports to TransFair of all sales and
purchases of Fair Trade products.
· Pay TransFair a licensing fee of 10 cents for each
pound of green FT certified coffee purchased from a
certified importer.
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Fair Trade Certified coffee standards require
buyers to pay a fixed minimum price for coffee
that was negotiated with small-scale producers
in the 1990s.  In mid-2001, that price was nearly twice the prevailing spot market price in
a very depressed coffee market, but still less than 15 percent of the prevailing market
prices for specialty coffee in Northern markets. (See Figure 5.) Buyers of certified fair
trade coffee must make available partial payment to the farmers at the time their coffee is
shipped, when requested. This differs from the usual industry practice in which producers
ship their coffee to brokers and are paid only if and when that coffee is eventually sold.
The resulting delays in payments often force small-scale coffee farmers to fall back upon
usurious credit systems, since they must cover all the costs of harvesting and processing
the coffee months before they are paid by the brokers. Finally, certified fair trade
encourages longer-term contractual relationships, discouraging one-time purchases on the
spot market.
Sales of Fair
Trade Certified
coffee in the
United States
have gone from
virtually nothing
in 1998 to an
estimated 7
million pounds
in 2001; global
sales of the
entire FLO
network are
expected to
exceed 30
million pounds
in 2001. There
are now more
than 100 coffee
companies
selling Fair
Trade Certified
coffee in the
United States,
including the
pioneer
companies (Equal Exchange, Peace Coffee, and Cooperative Coffees), café chains such
as Starbuck's, Peet's, and Tully's, food chains such as Whole Foods, Wild Oats,
Andronico's, ShopRite, Stop N Shop and some Safeway stores, and even most
ExxonMobil convenience stores in New England.
Figure 5.  Spot Coffee Prices Compared with Fair Trade Certified Minimum
Price
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The direct impact of this upon the coffee farmers is significant, especially in times of
very low spot market prices for coffee.  With the current $0.60/pound difference between
the spot price in mid-2001 and the minimum price paid for Fair Trade Certified coffee,
sales of this level imply annual net gains for farmers of more than $18 million dollars per
year for participating in fair trade certification. But demand in this case remains well
below supply.  There are more than 550,000 farmers listed on the Fair Trade worldwide
coffee producer registry; and they produce an estimated 170 million pounds each year.18
After growth in sales in Europe began to stagnate in the mid-1990s, growth in the U.S.
markets has led the world.  And the growth of sales in the U.S. has been driven, more
than anywhere else, by NGO advocacy to convince companies to offer certified coffee to
their customers.
Elements of a Theory: The Attraction of Certification for Transnational
Corporations
Why would corporations willingly choose to participate in certification schemes? The
logic can be established in a set of simple propositions:
1. Branding. Given the increasing importance of retail concentration and the top-
level importance to firms of establishing their brands -- for some firms the
majority of their investment is said to go towards branding -- consumer awareness
is the “name of the game” in terms of global production growth. The historical
importance of branding has been the focus of countless studies. Marketing
specialists look with envy upon global brands, “brands whose positioning,
advertising strategy, personality look, and feel are in most respects the same from
one country to another.”19 This is a problematic strategy for smaller firms,
reinforcing its importance and advantage for large firms.20
2. Vulnerability. The more successful a firm becomes in dominating a particular
industry, and the more successful it is in getting worldwide recognition of its
product label or logo, the more to vulnerable it becomes to pressure on social and
environmental grounds. Every dollar invested successfully in strengthening
consumer recognition of a global brand paradoxically also increases the firm's
vulnerability to attacks on that brand.
3. Risk reduction. Certification systems can constitute a risk-reduction strategy for
globally-branded firms, a form of insurance against criticism of a firm's practices.
Unsubstantiated or fraudulent attacks may be easy to thwart, but well-organized,
well-documented acts of corporate engagement by NGOs are the marketing
manager's nightmare. The best response is to search for a certification system to
validate that the firm is, in fact, pursuing appropriate social and environmental
practices.
4. Credibility. It is only natural for a firm to assert a “code of conduct” according to
which it will perform. But such “first party” claims have weak credibility. Hence,
no matter how sophisticated the process, “first party” claims yield little risk
12
reduction. It is then natural for an industry to attempt to create a carefully-
controlled industry-wide set of standards to protect its members from charges of
social or environmental irresponsibility. The chemical industry was one of the
first to develop such a scheme, the “Responsible Care Program” initiated after the
disaster in Bhopal, India.21 The Sustainable Forestry Initiative is another of these
“second party” certification attempts, wherein the industry association sets
standards that are relatively easy for all its members to meet. It does not take long
to realize that independent, third-party certification is the only road to credible
certification, although hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent reaching
that conclusion.
5. Costs. Previous economic analyses of the costs of certification tended to focus on
the fixed costs of meeting minimum standards and obtaining certification, plus the
variable costs of expanding the output of certified products.22 It is equally
important, however, to recognize the additional benefits, over and above sheer
production economics, that businesses gain from engaging with certification
systems. Businesses understand the value of reducing a risk, and they are
normally willing to pay for that reduction. They pay for bonding of key
management employees and they insure themselves against exchange rate risk and
casualties of all sorts; by the same logic, they are willing to pay for certification
that their practices meet well-established standards. The costs of certification,
furthermore, may be offset by savings associated with shortening the value chain.
Chain-of-custody certification in forest products has tended to reduce the number
of intermediaries, generating net benefits for both producers and retailers. Fair
Trade Certified coffee, for example, is most often sold directly from producer
cooperatives to roasters, again shortening the value chain and permitting a
combination of higher prices for the producers (as warranted by the requirements
for certification) without requiring the roaster or retailer to charge higher final
market prices. Home Depot, a notoriously tough negotiator of prices for forest
products, is paying a premium for most of the certified wood it purchases, yet it
does not pass that premium on to the consumer.
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6. Ancillary benefits. There are additional benefits for industry leaders in
certification. These can include the positive advantages of market differentiation
brought about by early entry into a green or fair-trade certified market. Some
retailers have reported that employee satisfaction with their leadership in the shift
to certified forest products has increased morale and reduced turnover, yielding
immediate benefits in terms of labor costs. Financial markets are increasingly
aware of environmental risks, and the so-called “socially responsible investors”
networks often use FSC certification as a screen for the highest levels of social
and environmental responsibility in the industry. The latest example of this is the
June 2001 announcement of the creation of the Xylem Rainforest Fund, L.P.,
which is seeking to invest $500 million in forestry companies in the tropics and
sub-tropics that adhere to the FSC standards for sustainable forest management.23
These propositions constitute the simple analytics of why a firm would find certification
systems to its benefit, so long as the costs imposed by meeting the standards were not
excessive.
Elements of a Theory: Why NGOs Find Certification Systems Attractive
What leverage do certification systems offer to advocacy groups that seek to improve the
social and environmental performance of firms? A parallel logic leads creative NGOs,
from Greenpeace and World Wildlife Fund to Global Exchange and Oxfam, to find
corporate engagement through certification systems a highly productive approach to
reaching their goals.
Global advocacy. Over the past 50 years there have been myriad campaigns focused on
“advocacy against” certain corporate practices. Improved international communications
have greatly increased the ability of advocates to orchestrate truly global sets of actions.
Increased transparencies in firms and changing governmental reporting requirements
have further increased the ability of advocacy groups to launch market-focused
campaigns. And networks of NGOs have begun to organize as never before to wield
“sticks” against corporations and official global economic institutions, documenting and
criticizing their practices and calling for changes in behavior.24 However, when there is
no agreed-upon set of changes that are being pursued, the resulting changes in corporate
behavior may be difficult to document. Moreover, continued changes in practice may be
costly to monitor and the permanence of changes may therefore be questionable.
Maintaining the energy of staff, volunteers, and contributors for such efforts may be
difficult.
Consolidating the gains of advocacy, plus an alternative. Certification systems embody a
specific set of alternative practices toward which advocacy campaigns can drive
corporate and other international actors. Systems for verifying change, and for
monitoring it over time, can be set up that are independent of both the advocacy NGO
and of the target corporation or institution. These systems can be financially self-
sufficient if the organization seeking certification pays the costs of the certification
process. Success can be measured tangibly. And satisfaction with the changes produced
14
can motivate staff and volunteers to continue the effort, and can motivate financial
supporters to continue to provide funding.
Stakeholder-based standards. Standards can be created out of whole cloth and
superimposed on the subjects of the process, but direct engagement of corporations and
other institutions in the standard-setting process increases the likelihood of reaching
consensus on requirements that are both improvements over current practice and
minimally acceptable to the target firms. Multiple voices can be incorporated; standards
to meet all of their needs can be created; and advocacy can be used to encourage
continued participation by the firms in the standard-setting process. Ownership of the
resulting standards by the full range of stakeholders is much more likely to achieve the
stipulated goals than could be expected with externally superimposed standards.
Identification of industry leaders. Just as labor unions select an industry leader on the
basis of complex analyses of the firms with which to negotiate, NGOs can identify an
industry leader on the basis of its vulnerability “on the ground.” This may be a function
of the evidence available with respect to its practices; or it may relate to its importance in
the industry. MacMillan Bloedel was apparently selected by advocacy groups in British
Columbia because of its paramount importance in the region. It also may have been
selected because its president was in the middle of a “turnaround,” in which he took a
firm that was losing more than $300 million per year and transformed it into one that was
earning nearly $50 million per year. Starbucks may have been a target for advocacy in
support of improved pricing practices for coffee farmers because of its national
prominence and market share. It also may have been targeted because, by promising to
create a code of conduct for producers that sold to it, the firm had avoided a threatened
boycott in 1996 by the Guatemala Labor Education Project.  Those promises later proved
impossible for the small advocacy group to monitor, leading to negligible results.
Positive imbalances. Advocacy groups are typically conceded by the general public to
have greater credibility than firms or industry associations. This is a very important
positive imbalance that NGOs can, and do, exploit. Firms and industry need very large
marketing budgets to persuade the public that first-party or second-party sets of standards
are worthy of consumer confidence. It takes far less resources for advocacy groups to
counter those campaigns through well-organized press conferences, well-covered
demonstrations, and the free publicity that these generate. The more attractive alternative
for industry is to participate with advocacy groups in creating standards and certification
systems that put both sides on the same track.
Cumulative effects. One reason given by coffee industry representatives for refusing to
endorse certification of organic or “sustainably harvested” coffee, revealed at a recent
meeting of the Specialty Coffee Association of America, is their fear that consumers will
see labeled coffees and ask “And what's wrong with all the others?” Every successful
certification scheme, every label well-placed before consumers, and every campaign that
successfully raises consumer consciousness of production and process methods, sows
doubts about all unlabeled products on the shelf. Does this mean that full-fledged
certification systems need to be created for every production dimension of every product?
15
Not necessarily, for many production and process claims are now routinely used to
distinguish environmentally preferable products. “Chlorine-free” and “recycled” paper
products are examples. Requirements for the use of those labels has become codified in
law; and government (presumably) monitors their appropriate use. “Dolphin-safe” canned
tuna has entered public awareness to the point that continued advocacy may be less
necessary. More importantly, certification systems offer the possibility of raising public
awareness to the point that unlabeled products will be increasingly resisted by consumers
and laws to curtail repugnant environmental and labor practices will be pressed upon
governments.
Certification and Poverty Alleviation
The movement for Fair Trade certification represents an explicit attempt to assure that the
first level of producers, e.g., the small-scale coffee farmers it is designed to serve, receive
higher prices, more direct access to markets, and improved long-term contractual
relationships with the buyers of their coffee.  Consumers are encouraged to recognize that
they are contributing to sustainable livelihoods for these farmers at a cost which may be
only a few cents (and a very small percentage increase) in the price of the final product.
Given that farmers are receiving as little $0.60 per pound in mid-2001 for coffee that
often retails at, or above, $10.00 per pound, the Fair Trade price of $1.26 means an
increase of 110% in the price that farmers receive.  For the consumer, however, the
increase is only about six percent, if, indeed, the full increase is passed on.  This price
premium is generally managed by the coffee co-operatives themselves, with some portion
of it used to improve infrastructure of the co-op or to fund community projects such as
schools and clinics and the remainder returned directly to the farmers.
The poverty alleviation impacts of certification of sustainably managed forests and chain-
of-custody certification of forest product processors are less direct, possibly much
greater, and generally less well documented.  Forest products industry livelihoods may
become more sustainable in certified forests.  Managing forests sustainably most often
implies a slower and more continuous rate of harvesting, rather than the once-every-
seventy-years massive harvesting practiced by traditional commercial logging.  The
boom-and-bust mentality of temporary mill towns is replaced, in theory, by a sustained
balance between continuous harvesting of wood products and continuous processing of
them over much longer periods of time.
The ecological benefits of FSC standards helps communities to build forest assets rather
than destroy them, whether the forests are community-owned or privately-owned.  The
use of variable retention harvesting techniques, as opposed to massive clearcutting, is
expected to reduce greatly the erosion that occurs and to retain forests of mixed age and
mixed species.  It also contributes to the retention of greater biodiversity in fauna and
flora, encouraging livelihoods based on non-timber forest products.  Reductions in the
use of chemicals reduces the damaging runoff into local streams, lessening the health
consequences for local residents.
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The chain-of-custody certification process also introduces, or protects, some aspects of
the working conditions for workers in forest product mills.  This certification requires
that all local laws be followed, in addition to requirements for systematic management of
certified products separate from uncertified products in a mill or factory.  And there have
been examples where worker safety conditions have been improved as a condition for C-
o-C certification. 25
Small-scale and community-based forests have had less success in penetrating the
booming global market for certified forest products than large-scale industrial production.
But there is a growing number of successful community-based certification efforts that
have reaped greater market access and, in some cases, significant market price premiums
for their forest products that neighboring uncertified community forests were unable to
obtain.
Challenges to the Theory
The biggest challenge to the theory presented in this paper comes from multi-process,
multi-dimensional products. How can one trace mineral products to market, when mining
firms rarely sell their products directly to consumers? The diamond industry, by virtue of
its monopoly structure, is an interesting exception, and is the one component of the
mining industry that is most interested in creating certification systems.26  Some
advocacy campaigns have been effective in this type of industry by focusing on financial
markets, the banking sector, and shareholders, invoking the increased risk of financial
loss when production takes place under less-controlled circumstances than certification
systems would provide.
A major challenge to the evolving practice of retailer-based advocacy arises for products
for which there are no easy targets in the form of industry leaders. Partly for this reason,
the Marine Stewardship Council, created about the same time as the Forest Stewardship
Council, has had much less success either in certifying sustainably managed fisheries or
in creating demand for the products of such certified fisheries.27
An additional challenge to be expected is the proliferation of deceptive or fraudulent
labels and claims of certification. As quickly as markets respond to legitimate labels,
“knock-offs” can be expected to proliferate, offering a degree of certification protection
to some firms or industries while requiring less responsible behavior or changes in
practices. Some have argued the SFI and PEFC forestry certification programs fall into
this category.
Consumer confusion due to the proliferation of labels, even when most or all of them are
legitimate, can create further problems. The creation of other fair-trade certification
labels, such as those from the Fair Trade Federation and organizations such as Fairtrade
e.V. in Europe is an example. They use some of the same core concepts, and make
similar claims, but represent very different certification systems. Consumers Union (CU)
is working on a solution to this problem through its Ecolabeling Encyclopedia website
that will provide consumers with information on the principal characteristics of most eco-
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labels, including CU's own judgment of the extent to which the label is a third-party,
independent label, and the standards that have to be met to earn that label. 28
A further problem arises from the fixity of absolute standards. Standards are set on the
basis of the best technical information available at the time; yet changes in technical
possibilities can generate pressures to revise standards, leading some stakeholders to seek
to re-open the standard setting process and stiffen the requirements. The public-relations
cost of backing out of a commitment to a certification process in that eventuality could be
very high.
There are also problems when relative standards are used, rather than absolute standards.
Relative standards reward firms with a seal or label for improving their practices, even
though these practices may remain far short of the desired goal. The “ECO-OK” and
“Better Banana” labels of the Rainforest Alliance's Conservation Agriculture Program are
examples of this type of standard.29 Other advocacy groups criticize such standards
because they do not demand enough of firms before awarding the label: small reductions
in pesticide use, rather than rapid movement toward the elimination of pesticide use, may
be enough to garner a label, for example. The counterargument is that absolute standards,
such as organic certification, set the bar too high for most producers, and therefore have
less impact on environmental practices.
Other Potential Applications
Certification systems are potentially applicable to a wide range of areas. The Rainforest
Alliance is presently developing a framework for a global accreditation system for
certified sustainable tourism and ecotourism. This framework, to be completed in time for
the World Conference on Ecotourism scheduled to be held in Quebec City in 2002, is
likely to propose standards that would apply to existing tourism and ecotourism
certification programs, rather than creating a wholly new program as was done by the
FSC.
Certification systems for mining activities are also being considered. The World
Conference of Mining Ministers, convened in Ottawa in 2000, opened with a three-hour
plenary focused on “Do we need mining certification systems?” The International
Institute for Environment and Development has been engaged in the creation of an
initiative called Mining Minerals and Sustainable Development, funded by the World
Business Council for Sustainable Development, which seeks to engage stakeholders in
the question of whether mining can be compatible with sustainable development.30 A
parallel effort, with greater likelihood of generating a certification system, is presently
underway among a global coalition of mining-related NGOs, led by the Mineral Policy
Center in Washington, D.C. and WWF/Australia. They are quietly engaging a small
group of major mining companies that are willing to discuss the possibility of developing
a set of standards relating to both social and environmental characteristics of mining
worldwide. At the same time, the Environmental Law Institute, the Sociedad Peruana de
Derecho Ambiental, and Oxfam-America are working on the development of
community-based standards that would apply to mining in the Andean countries, where
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the tensions among environmental concerns, indigenous peoples, government, and the
mining industry have been especially acute in recent years.
Certification of the social and environmental practices of cruise ships is being explored
by the Oceans Blue Foundation. 31 Certification of sustainable agricultural practices,
including both social and environmental dimensions, has been developed in the Portland
OR area by The Food Alliance and is being spread to the midwestern states of the U.S. by
The Midwest Food  Alliance.32
There are also opportunities for certification systems to intersect with the implementation
of global conventions. For example, the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species (CITES) currently bans all sales of the ivory from a slain elephant,
regardless of the circumstances in which the elephant was killed. What happens when
marauding elephants have trampled the fields of an African village, or where the
population of the elephants is too large, or where elephants have become life-threatening
in a particular village? Some have been asking whether a certification system could be
created for ivory from legitimate sources, perhaps alongside a fund to compensate the
villagers in those areas where elephant conservation forces them to accept agricultural
damage from the animals.
Conclusions
Citizen-led advocacy campaigns linked to the establishment of certification systems
represent a new movement that is only now gaining major strength. The ability of
advocacy groups to bring market pressures to bear upon firms offers a powerful
alternative to simple invocations of corporate altruism and civic responsibility. In an
increasingly privatized world, with restrictions on what the global trading system will
allow local and national governments to legislate, these movements may be the only
alternative to the competitive downgrading of social and environmental practices by
firms worldwide.
There is evidence that financial markets are paying increasing attention to these
dimensions of corporate practice, rewarding firms that become leaders, and punishing
those that lag behind. The incentives for corporate collaboration in the creation and
management of certification systems appear to be growing. Struggles between NGOs and
corporations can be expected to continue, for many of the same reasons that firms also
struggle against government regulations. In the 21st century, this dynamic new strategy
for corporate engagement may become an important global force for “civilizing
globalization,” and for assuring that its environmental and social benefits exceed its costs.
This paper is based upon a talk delivered to the Political Economy Workshop at the University of
Massachusetts, Amherst, on October 3, 2000. It has benefited greatly from the comments offered at that
workshop. The opinions in the paper are those of the author alone; they do not necessarily reflect in any way
the perspectives of the Ford Foundation.
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